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Building a Vibrant State‑Civil
Society in Cameroon Facing the
Changes of the New Millenium
John W. Forje
1 The author acknowledges with profound thanks the assistance given by John Suh Che and
Chief F. Fotem of the Cameroonian Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research.
A country in disarray
2 The economic and political performance of Cameroon during the past two decades has
been  generally  poor.  Per  capital  food  production  has  remained  in  an  extremely
discouraging state even though Cameroon remains the bread basket for countries within
the central African Sub‑region. Poverty is on the increase where more than 50% of the
population  are  classified  as  "poor  country"  following  the  1999  United  Nations
Development  Programme (UNDP),  Report  for  Cameroon.  The  population  growth rate
stands at over 2.8 % (Forje forthcoming).  Corruption and mismanagement are on the
increase with Cameroon receiving the honour or dishonour of the first position as the
most corrupt nation in the world according to the Transparency International Findings.
The  country's  human  rights  record  is  deplorable,  and  transition  towards  genuine
democratisation transition following the second wave of political changes blowing across
the continent and the rest of the developing world is not a good one. Civic associations
are viewed by the state as enemies. Whereas state and civic association accord should be
treated as complimentary bodies and partners in the development process. They should
not be apart but parts of the common struggle for the socio‑economic and technological
transformation of the society. The banking sector is in total shambles as over ten banks
have wounded up during the past  decade.  There is  a  total  lost  of  confidence in the
financial  sector  and the  government  in  general.  General  production  is  low with  the
exception of the increase in the brewery sector. Cameroon is an alcoholic consuming
nation as every other house is a drinking bar. Over five different new brands of beer have
been introduced into the market within the last year. Cameroonians find peace with the
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cup. The disadvantage is that it blurs their perception, line of action and attitude towards
change. This works favourably to the advantage of the ruling regime.
3 There is a general drop in the standard of living ‑ the result of two salary cuts amounting
to 70% in 1993 and 1994 : a hundred percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 ; two
months of unpaid salaries to civil servants in 1993 ; and the general increase in the debt
burden, external and internal.  All these factors add to the plight of the Cameroonian
population  who  today  is  considered  the  most  devalued human  beings  within  the
continent.  The  sad  fact  is  the  non‑existing  of  price  control  system  and  consumer's
association to defend the rights of the consumers. Petrol sells at 425 CFA francs per liter.
4 However, one good record, is that peace before the storm reigns in the country, even
though insecurity to human life and property is in the increase. Though the country has
come a long way from the horrific era of the single‑party system, much remains to be
done  to  attain  genuine  democratic  governance  and  good  management.  So  far,  the
transition to political pluralism has been plagued by electoral fraud and stolen victories
by the incumbent regime sitting tight in spite of the lost of credibility and legitimacy
amongst the people. The victory and power of the ballot box has never been respected
and valued in the country. This thwarts the political dimensions on which depends the
socio‑economic, technologically transformation and development of the society.
5 Though rich in natural  resources and human potentials,  for almost two decades,  the
country  once  overwhelmed  by  economic  growth  miracle,  the  African  style,  is  now
constrained by debt burden, economic stagnation, corruption and mismanagement. The
1990s is groping with the paradox of civil strife, increasing abject poverty and misery
boldly carved in gold on the faces of the vast majority of the population. This is backed
with a complex transition process to democracy and liberal economic setting. Generally,
one  can  state  that  the  country  though  pulling  towards  the  practice  of  multi‑party
democracy, (thanks perhaps to the collapse of the Berling Wall) on the one hand, and
economic  disintegration  on  the  other  ‑  the  result  of  out  right  embezzlement  of
government funds and the misuse of natural resources through the forces of an external
unsustainable exploitation ‑ Cameroon remains a nation with vast potentials capable of
bundling itself out of the present economic, political chaos and malaise that confronts
many African nations.
6 So far, there is the poor record of government performance, i.e. the transfer of authority
and resources  to  capitalist  institution.  Even the  best  managed state  enterprises  (the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC)), for example is up for sale. It is the French
economic industrial complexes and interests that eventually will be the beneficiaries in
the take‑over of state enterprises in the country.
7 Reducing the role of the state via the mechanisms of privatisation and simply getting the
price right alongside other macro‑policies have proven insufficient to put development
on the right course. Presently, one can at best develop an attitude of wait and see the
outcomes of the ongoing privatisation process which seems to have taken off the ground
from a bad perspective.  The outcome is  that insistence on privatisation measures by
external bodies helps to place resources cheaply for the exploiters with the consequences
of a deepening of the declining situation of the country's economic. This is reflected in
Cameroon's increasing reliance on foreign grants and loans which have increased the
debt burden and the dependency of the country. Because of the devaluation of the CFA
franc, Cameroon is depleting its natural resources for less the amount obtained a few
years back.
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8 The role of the international community has been the formula prescription of the Bretton
Woods  Financial  Institutions  through  the  policy  strategy  of  Structural  Adjustment
Programmes (SAP). Yet the new prescription offered by Western financial institutions to
ameliorate existing conditions has turn out to be a curse rather than a blessing, hence
SAP is better known as Structural or Social Added Problems in view of its impacted social
and economic consequences on the vast majority of the marginalized population. The
rural population and poor are paying the price for World Bank/IMF imposed structural
approaches which only enriches the rich.
9 In short, the dictates of the Bretton Woods Institution in compliance with the ganging up
or unholy alliance with the ruling elites, political power brokers and other stake holders
within  Cameroon  continue  to  have  a  profound  impact  on  the  country's  fragile  and
vulnerable political economy ‑  an impact that is likely to be extended an exponential
rather than short and specific impact as the country embraces the mythical decade 2000.
10 Hence, any contemporary debate on Cameroon must put into context the post‑Cold War
realities, the so‑called new world order, the renewed international division of labour and
power, without of course, by passing existing internal constraints particularly that of
ethnic hegemonic politics, authoritarianism, the support of the military and, not least,
the strong adherence to the inherent role of the single‑party system as the only path to
governance no matter the cost to the nation. The distinctive features of Cameroon in an
era  of  national  adjustment  and  global  transformation  need  to  be  recognised  and
incorporated into both examination and prescription.
11 This paper attempts to address issues from that perspective and as well as advances pro
active strategic policy measures that can better put Cameroon on a solid and productive
footing  to  democratic  governance  and  good  management  at  the  dawn  of  a  new
millennium. It surveys the major political, economic, social, ecological and gender‑related
aspects  of  Cameroon'  s  struggle  or  no struggle towards democracy in the 1990s  and
beyond.
12 It builds on two fundamentally sets of ideas ; first the internal equilibrium which can be
restored only through institutional changes, and, secondly, the role of the international
community.  Internally  also  are  the  broader  issues  of  the  subjects  of  women
marginalization and environmental degradation, and how the political economy of the
country has played havoc with, and the causes of the problems related to these issues.
13 Although both civil society and political economy are in transition, it would be erroneous
to impose extra Cameroon perceptions, prescriptions and expectations. Yet it is necessary
that certain guidelines be taken into serious consideration, otherwise, the country has no
future and no framework on which to build a sustainable society.
14 Societal collapse in Cameroon cannot be treated only as a function of "strategic" issues
based on statist assumptions that emphasised great powers rivalry on the resources of
country,  but  also  must  include  and  prioritise  a  range  of  new  forces  of  gender  and
population, ecology and environment,  food and nutrition,  shelter and health,  conflict
over  natural  resources  and  the  greater  ethnic  and  political  divide  confronting  and
constraining integrated sustainable development within the society.
15 The combination of economic, political and ecological crisis beginning in the 1980s has
contributed to a new policy and political context, many people now accept and advocate
the practice of political pluralism, transparency, accountability as the best options for
moving the country forward and in the right path.
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Civil society and democratic transition
16 Leslie Fox notes that "civil society is a political concept because it is essentially about
power, the power of non‑state actors to participate in making decisions that have an
impact on them". The failure of the nation‑state as a liberator of its people but playing
the role as an oppressor of the inalienable rights of its citizens and backed with the
collapse of  the communist  system, triggered a new wave of  political  democratisation
process in the 1990s that equally witnessed a marked reorientation of both academic and
political discourse on development. Civil society was entrusted with a vibrant weapon
once taken away by the institutionalisation of the dominant monolithic party structure.
17 The fall of the Berlin Wall engineered a new path to constructing a "political culture" in
the developing regions of the world. In the case of Cameroon, the top‑down approach
institutionalised through the single‑party proved that development does not work in that
pattern ;  of  the  state  remaining for  long the  rational  instrument  for  promoting and
controlling change in the direction of  providing quality living standards for the vast
majority of the population. : rather it had increased affluence for a selected few. The state
of growing influence and affluence of the few eroded the ability of the State to be such a
powerful  instrument ‑  had been replaced by growing disillusionment.  From both the
leftist  and rightist  perspectives,  the Cameroon State was viewed as an instrument of
exploitation, pre‑empting popular or individual initiative and revolt as well as fanning
discriminative politics of ethnic confrontation and economic chaos. Thus civil society in
Cameroon remained passive or captive and weak from 1st September 1966 to 26 May 1990.
18 Political  parties  and  civic  associations  were  co‑opted  or  coerced  into  a  single‑party
structure ‑ The Cameroon Nation Union (CND) later transformed into Cameroon Peoples
Democratic Movement (CPDM) until the launching of the Social Democratic Front (SDF)
on 26 May 1990 by Ni John Fru Ndi. The gunning down of unarmed civilians by the State
military power being indicative of the resistance towards changing the existing political
status quo of a few lording it over the majority.
19 Though political pluralism reigns in Cameroon after the creation of the SDF has emerged
as an envy of war tom states, much has yet to be done to institutionalize and legalize the
various  institutions  to  reflect  the  state  of  political  pluralism in  the  country.  By  all
standards, Cameroon is still a one party‑party state in disguise. It is still governed by the
dictates and structures of authoritarian regime form ‑  the captivity of the legislature,
judiciary and bureaucracy by a powerful presidency which treats the other branches of
government as an offspring of a political party machinery ‑ CNU/CPDM property. What is
evident is that development wisdom is no longer lodged in government bureaucracies but
in local communities and institutions ‑ in short, in the people, that is, where indigenous
knowledge and popular participation occupy increasing prominence in the development.
The  captivity  of  the  Cameroon  civil  society  was  the  result  of  two  integrated
fundamentals ; (i) the institutionalization of a monolithic political system in 1966, and (ii)
the  abolishment  of  the  federal  governance  system  in  1972  which  intensified
centralization and the  co‑optation of  the  English speaking sector  in  to  the  ambit  of
French centralized system. As a result,  civil  society went into slumber and Cameroon
degenerated into what has been until now an authoritarian state that violated ail aspects
of fundamental human rights and liberties. There is now an emerging vibrant civil society
that  could challenged the state  in 1992 through the politics  of  "ghost  towns" which
helped in crippling the economic base of the country as well as in weakening the political
structure and legitimacy of the party, state, and government. Taking the bull by the horn,
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the path for a return to a democratic governance system was gradually being formed. A
new vibrant society is now in the making.
20 So far, the Cameroon civil society has been confronted with problems of political apathy,
lack of organisation, a sense of direction and leadership. Generally democracy requires
organisation. Organisations requires an interest in public affair (see Hydén 1998 : 18). The
failure  of  the  nation‑state  to  be  the  liberator  of  the  people  since  independence and
particularly from the 1990s prompted Cameroonians to adopt a cynical and distrustful
attitude towards politics and the state.
21 Even though the Second Republic under Paul Biya (1987) produced Communal Liberalism,
advocating for change,  the damage had already been done as the issues or slogan of
"rigor,  moralization and democratization" were more or less  deplored to tarnish the
image of the First republic rather than put into action the true meanings of the above
concepts. The misuse of these concepts became a part of the system, and used as a false
passport for personal accumulation and of bleeding the nation to death. An interesting
analysis is given by Bayart (1993) in what he terms "the politics of the belly". Echoing on
the issue, the Le Messager newspaper (16 March 1992) wrote :
"A sentiment of disappointment gradually replaced that of hope as it dawned on
Cameroonians that qualification,  competence and merit  was the preserve of  the
President's  tribesmen.  Slowly,  but  surely,  they  started  taking  over  all  strategic
appointments once held by people of different tribal horizons. In an expansive and
greatly  populated  divisions  like  Noun,  disappointment  soon  made  way  for
bitterness as the division was suddenly taken over by the Betis ‑  SDO, five D.0s,
three  (chef)  police  officers,  medical  officers,  chief  magistrates,  prison
superintendents etc. The story was the same in every other province of Cameroon
as a top civil servant once inadvertently confirmed on T.V. by saying that thirty
seven of the forty nine divisions were headed by Betis."
22 The situation has not abated. Rather, it is on the increase for every appointment made be
it in the private or public sector. Less than a decade in office, civil society could easily
access the achievements of the New Deal Government (NDG) with that of the predecessor.
The record of the NDG remains pathetic in many aspects countless catastrophes, salary
cuts  disasters,  decline  in  living  standards,  so  salary  increase  for  the  past  18  years,
embezzlement  and  hundreds  of  other  cases.  Takoungang  and  others  (Takoungang  &
Krieger 1998) point how much capital was siphoned from state coffers within a year and
how tribalism was institutionalized in the public and private sectors with regards to
appointments  into  key  administrative  posts.  These  acts  were  enough  to  pacify  civil
society or to induce it to greater actions for change. Or what Diamond (1994 : 4‑17) sees as
civil society being "the realm of organized social life" standing between individuals and
political institutions of representation."
23 Civil society in Cameroon had to be vibrant in order to create a new political agenda and
landscape in respect to what Diamond sees as civil society strengthening the democratic
process in respect of :
• Containing the power of the state through public scrutiny ;
• stimulating political participation by citizen ;
• developing such democratic norms as tolerance and compromise ;
• creating ways of articulating, aggregating and representing interest outside political parties,
especially at the local level ;
• mitigating conflict through cross‑cutting or overlapping interests ;
• recruiting and training political leaders ;
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• questioning and reforming existing democratic institutions and procedures ;
• disseminating information.
24 Civil  society revolt against the state and the ruling CPDM, known in a way as "chop
people" (dem moni),  could be seen through the institutionalization of  the ghost  town
politics which crippled the economy as well as weakened and challenged the authority
and legitimacy of the state. State responses in the wake of establishing its lost legitimacy
came from the state of emergency and other tough measures clamped on the society and
in  particular  the  province  and  house  of  the  leader  of  the  SDF ;  the  arrest  of  SDF
supporters  and sympathises,  the  seizure  and destruction of  peoples  property  by  the
forces of law, confinement of opposition supporters and worse still, the killing of innocent 
unarmed citizens.
25 Analysing the situation, Philip Burham (1996 : 160), Takougang & Krieger (1998 : 8) note
that "The Cameroon state has not descended to the level of the Zairois state" and "what
Cameroonians have seen since 1990 called to crise / the crisis must be made clear for
those who do not yet recognize its depth and duration". Michael Schatzberg (1986 : 14)
likened Cameroon's state apparatus to the African domestic community,  the paternal
premises of nurturance satistying a "complex and largely unarticulated moral matrix of
legitimate governance". He also adds that in Cameroon "fathers" in the presidency and
high offices fattened up on "sons left with little nourishment now, or prospects in the
future".  Government legitimacy was gone,  and would have to be restored before any
democratization could take place.
26 Beyond  being  voluntary,  self‑generating,  autonomous,  and  rule  abiding,  civil  society
organisations  played what  could be  termed "parochial  society"  ‑  in  several  respects.
Fundamental here was the part that civil society played a balancing role – i.e. balancing
state's power in respect of (i) breaking state monopoly over resources mobilization and
allocation, and (ii) decentralizing developmental responsibilities to local self‑generating
institutions.
27 The events of 26th May 1990 triggered developments within the two framework. First the
credibility hegemony and legitimacy of the ruling regime and party was described and
seriously challenged. Government response was to initiate token adjustments to apace
the  situation  and  re‑establish  lost  confidence  ‑  for  example,  the  idea  of  a  national
conference  or  "grand  debate"  to  address  the  political  crisis,  the  opening  up  of  the
political space ‑ political pluralism with the result of overl50 political parties registered ;
movements  towards  the  liberalization  of  press  freedom,  conducting  multi‑party
elections, even though these elections have not been devoid of fraud and other electoral
malpractices to ensure the continuation in power of the old regime.
28 The 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections marked a new turning point in the
political annals of Cameroon. For the first time since the creation of the single‑party
(1966) and the abolition of the federal system (1972), the National Assembly (1992) no
longer was a hand clapping and captive body per se. It took a new dimension, even if only
token ‑  that of a competitive institution with more than one political party. The new
parliament saw the entry of the National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP or
UNDP) emerging as the major opposition party with 68 seats, the UPC (Cameroon's oldest
political party) with 18 seats ; the MDR 6 seats and the ruling CPDM 78 seats. Through
political manipulation, the CPDM captured the UPC and MDR as well as a break away
fraction of the NUDP/UNDP into the government.
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29 The major opposition party (SDF) boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections on grounds
of the non‑establishment of an independent electoral commission (IEC) ; and the failure
by  the  government  to  set  the  rules  of  the  games  to  ensure  free  and  fair  elections.
However the party contested the 1992 Presidential elections which is allegedly claimed to
have won but victory stolen from Ni John Fru Ndi. A number of observers maintained that
the elections was fraudulently won (see among others Clark & Gardinier 1997 ; NDI 1993 ;
Takougang & Krieger 1998 ; Wongibe 1991).
30 In  1997  the  SDF  participated  in  the  parliamentary  elections  with  the  results  and
consequences of the party being robbed of victory. Observers reports are clear on this as
well  (Takougang & Krieger  1998 ;  NDIIA 1992 amongst  others).  The 1997 presidential
elections was boycotted by the SDF following the events and circumstance surrounding
the parliamentary elections. The controversial and final results place the SDF with 43
seats, the UNDP with 13, UDC 5, MDR l, MJLC l, and UPC 1 out of total of 180 parliamentary
seats with the ruling CPDM capturing the rest.
31 Since  1990,  the  Cameroon  civil  society  has  facilitated  the  introduction  and
constitutionalization of power, and a gradual return to democratic regime form in which
civil and political liberties are now, somehow guaranteed but with the sorrowful results
of the absence of public accountability of those in office not effectively assured.
32 The failure of  the state  as  a  liberator  of  the people  propelled civil  society'  s  efforts
towards  the  liberalization  and  privatization  of  the  economy  in  order  to  reduce  the
dominant role of the state in development. The creation of the SDF and the emergence of
many  mushroom  parties  backed  by  civil  society  played  a  catalytic  role  in  the
democratization transition process though Cameroon still has a long road to travel to
genuine democratic rules and practices.  The fact remains that a State‑led strategy of
development and democratization has been given new dimensions ‑  the results of the
failure  of  civilian‑authoritarian  regime  form to  promote  development  or  bring  back
economic growth to the level of the immediate post‑independence years has reinforced
the demands for regime change and transition.
33 The political landscape in Cameroon today is totally different from that of the 1980s and
early  1990s.  The  past  decade  has  witnessed  remarkable  progress  for  democracy  and
economic reforms. With the collapse of communism, democracy has reached or touched
every region of the world for the first time in history, and in the words of Huntington
(1992 : 8) become "the only legitimate and viable alternative to an authoritarian regime of
any kind".
34 Civil  society  in  Cameroon  has  been  a  cause  and  consequence  of  this  process  ‑  the
construction of a new political formula for the country, and even though the emergence
of a genuine democratic governments has yet to see daylight in Cameroon, the first step
has been taken in that direction. The move towards democracy provides the much needed
political space to manufacture new forms of governance whereby social capital can be
constructed.
The challenges
35 A  democratic  culture  of  participation,  moderation,  accommodation,  tolerance,  and
restraint  is  critical  to  the  consolidation  and  long‑term  stability  of  democracy.  Civil
society has a role to play towards the realization of such goals. Here lies the challenges
confronting civil society ‑ how to adopt a confrontational approach towards the state ‑ i.e.
defending individual liberties against the state and upholding the principles of civil and
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political rights of the individuals at any price. It could be argued that taking such an
uncompromising  approach  towards  the  state  may  undercut  the  overall  objective  of
building social capital and strengthening civil society. Hadenius & Uggla (1996) argue that
such a position is also fraught with its own risks.
36 The other is that of balancing state's power, how the state can be made to loosen its grip
over  society.  As  earlier  indicated this  may involve  (i)  reducing state  monopoly  over
resources  mobilization  and  allocation  and  (ii)  decentralizing  developmental
responsibilities  to  local  self‑governing  institutions.  This  strategy  entails  a  parallel
devolution of political authority to local government institutions as well as to grassroots
in order to enhance the chances of influencing public policy‑making.
37 What is vital is the (in) compatibility of political and economic liberalization. Both politics
and economics constitute complimentary processes with each impacting on the other in
many and varied ways. The challenge confronting civil society in Cameroon is that the
Cameroon  government  has  degenerated  into  a  system  of  personal  rule,  strongly
influenced and supported by ethnic  constellations and patronage networks since the
country between (1996‑1990) lacked a strong and coherent civil society necessary to hold
the state accountable for its actions.
38 Civil society during this period was co‑opted and coerced into the ruling organ of the
party and state machinery. Civil society became captive, weak and constituted nothing
short of a hand clapping or praise singing body that did not reflect the interests of the
people,  but  played  to  the  tones  of  the  government  and  its  offspring  ‑  the  ruling
CNU‑CPDM hegemony as well as to please exploitative foreign capital interests.
39 The challenge therefore, is for civil society to reverse existing trends ‑ that of the regime
displaying  rent‑seeking,  corrupt  and  authoritarian  behaviour,  or  creating  and
establishing  as  well  as  institutionalizing  an  environment  that  can  hardly  support  a
dynamic  economy  and  democratic  governance.  The  other  factor  is  to  regain  and
institutionalise  its  lost  or  fast  diminishing  hegemony ‑  i.e.  establishing  the  enabling
environment necessary to allow greater political and democratic participation.
40 Creating the necessary political agenda that encourages or inform people who had gone
into slumber because of the dark years (1966‑1990) and who until after 1990 still have
little or no experience with liberal  democratic structures of  governance.  In short,  to
institutionalize  "popular  participation and responsibility."  Presently,  current  rhetoric
concepts of "popular participation" avoids the people most affected ‑ the grassroots and
the suffering masses ‑ the rich have jumped on the bandwagon to continue to take away
from the "have‑nots". For example, the newspaper, Le Messager of 9 June 1992 wrote :
"It must be noted that Mr Biya's desire to pander to the needs of his clansmen had
women opened the floodgates of the fraud which manifested itself in capital flight,
embezzlement,  the  collapse  of  once viable  state  parastatals  such  as  Cameroon,
Societé  camerounaise  de  banque  (SCB),  National  Produce  Marketing  Board  (NPME)
BIAO and others. The horrible truth that soon became apparent was the fact that
the President of the Republic could no longer control his own people. He could not
even  control  his  wife  who  depleted  one  of  the  banks  to  build  villas,  a  palace,
plantations and other businesses for the Presidential couple and their numerous
relations."
41 So far, the policy and slogan of popular participation ignores an important stream of
democratic theory traceable to Aristotle, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill ; Alexis
de Tocqueville and a host of others on the prescription that participation involves "a
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containing inter‑relationship  between the  working institutions  and the  psychological
qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting with them" (Paterman 1970 : 22).
42 Rephrased  in  another  way,  participation  involves  not  just  policies  but  equally  the
development of social and political capacities of each individual establishing the theme
"popular participation". Schmitz (1992) states that "support for democratic participation
therefore  should  mean  empowering  the  people  to  make  their  own  decisions  not
engineering the forms of good governance which other elites are expected to undertake".
43 Civil society has to seriously deconstruct existing power structures of the regime and to
put  in  place  an alternative  strategy  that  is  more  authentically  democratic.  The  new
agenda of civil society should be one of democratizing existing authoritarian structures.
To begin with, this should involve, accepting that development is more than economic
growth and institutional structures of governance. Or what Tim Broadhead (1993) notes,
"a process of  realizing potential,  maximizing choices and allowing people thereby to
become more fully human".
44 The  state  of  political  impasse  and  urban  violence,  ethnic  cleansing  that  ravaged
Cameroon at the start of the democratization process in 1990 is traceable to the absence
of  views  expressed  by  Broadhead.  Civil  society  was  denied  its  rights  ‑  people  were
prevented from participating and sharing in the democratic and economic liberalization
process. The wealth of the nation became the prerogative of a selected few who felt they
were doing the nation a favour by constructing roads or providing social services and
other amenities to the society. In reality, funds for these development projects being the
sweat  of  the  suffering  masses  hijacked  by  the  governing  elites  as  their  personal
properties. Selfish interest has replaced the common interest, destroying the sense of
belonging amongst the excluded group of people within the society.
45 A state‑civil society accord has to be established for the country to move forward. This
requires the provision for increased opportunities for greater popular participation, the
re‑evaluation of  existing  policy  strategies  and the  role  of  dominant  players  who for
personal  reasons  and  self‑interests  continue to  stifle  national  development  and  the
emergence of genuine democracy within the society.
46 It is imperative that the entire structure of the existing development agenda and political
calendar of the ruling regime be re‑evaluated and reconstructed to reflect the political,
economic and social aspirations of the people, not that of a selected few who have created
an "isolated island of privileges" and continue to bleed the nation to destruction and
death.
47 Now that some form of quasi‑political pluralism and media freedom or liberty is attained,
what impact has this on society ? In short,  has anything changed from the days of a
captive, hand clapping and weak parliament to that of an institution sharing power with
other branches of the government, especially the executive ? Who participates, when,
how and  to  what  effect  in  the  emerging  new political  dispensation  of  the  societies
enormously important to the depth and durability of the democratization of the nation.
48 By  and  large,  the  new  political  dispensation  should  imply  removing  the  obstacles
(economic, gender, racial, cultural etc.) from existing power structures to persons and
communities developing the capacity for democratic governance. So far this is not the
case. What continues to exist is the total absence of the necessary political mechanism to
aid  the  transition  from  authoritarian  to  democratic  governance.  Incumbent  power
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brokers continue to thwart such mechanism to prolong their stay in power ‑ to maintain
existing status quo even in the wake of a new political wind blowing across the continent.
49 Existing  power  structures  continue  to  perpetuate  the  diffusion  of  ideologies  that
entrenches the grip on the state,  on the structures established immediately after the
attainment of political independence. Largely also because the developed democracies
and the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions for all their invocation of politically correct
language, have shown that they are not ready to surrender control over agenda setting to
local democratic forces. Western dominated development agenda constantly defines the
parameters of development and behaviour in Cameroon as well  as in other countries
under transition.  France takes the lead in articulating and setting the pace for  such
behaviour.  France  remains  the  principal  agent  for  "delivering  development"  to
Cameroon.  Here  we  find  French‑Western  and  internal  ideologies  of  the  ruling  elites
converge  to  destroying  and  placing  the  society  in  a  state  of  perpetual  poverty  and
underdevelopment.
50 Bratton & Van de Walle (1992 : 420) correctly argue that the "diffusionist and structural
interpretations partly explain recent political events in Africa in the course of transition,
the major participants and the dominant influences in every case have been national".
Who articulates policy strategies and measures for the destruction and not constructing
of  the  society ?  In  all  the  development  trajectories  and  strategies  of  post‑colonial
Cameroon  have  been  either  a  reflection  of,  or  a  reaction  to  the  agenda  set  by  the
strongest international players. Cameroon became vulnerable following the collapse of
the First Republic and to pressures exerted on the Second Republic by the very doings of
those who control the New Deal Regime.
51 Flowing from the preceding paragraph is the challenge of civil society standing up to the
forces  of  the  international  system.  Admittedly,  while  the  revival  of  civil  society  has
received encouragement from the international community, the global impact has also
been the down fall and weakening of civil society who for a number of reasons beg and
dance to the calls of these international bodies like state governments have done all these
years.
52 Civil society could gradually become a captive and weak instrument of external forces.
The challenge is how to exert autonomy and independence towards its objectives. So far,
the  question  is  whether  Cameroon  can  be  devorced  from  its  international  and
transnational connections and to resist the presence of dominant international financial
actors ?  The  challenges  for  civil  society  and  for  the  overall  survival  of  democratic
governance in Cameroon is to understand the issues of global connectedness that the
management  of  development  and  democracy  in  Cameroon  will  move  toward  more
democratic  and  developmental  connectedness  when  these  issues  are  coherently
appraised and incorporated into a common policy framework.
53 So  far,  the  Cameroon  Government  under  its  present  constituted  leadership  cannot
provide that connectedness with the impact and consequences that the society suffers
and trails behind in the democratization and economic liberalization processes. On top of
that, the country's image keeps declining within the international arena as the leader of
the nation has presented himself as an "absentee president" falling to be a participant in
international arenas where and when it  is necessary.  Cameroon has adopted a policy
strategy of keeping away from vital African and international fora.
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54 Two  recent  events  are  worth  mentioning  in  this  context.  First,  the  absence  of  the
President at the swearing ceremony of the civilian elected President of Nigeria (29 May
1999) ;  and the installation of  South Africa’s  second democratically  elected president
(Thabo Mbeki replacing retiring ageing President Nelson Mandela on 16 June 1999) does
not argue well for the international connectedness of Cameroon. To this could also be
added absence from the OUA meeting in Zimbabwe to hand over the presidency of that
organisation to the incoming president ; absence from the last special OUA meeting in
Tripoli to redefine a new code of conduct for the OAU at the dawn of a new millennium.
The list is long. Let us contend ourselves with those mentioned here.
55 The  above  mentioned  cases  presents  Africa's  best  attempts  at  embracing  the
democratization process and shift from authoritarian governance system. Could absence
be interpreted as a phobia in countries that presidents have been democratically elected
in a freely and fairly conducted electoral process ? Could absence be interpreted as a sign
of guilt ? Or should this be seen as the country's leadership being allergic to genuine
transformation to good governance ? What ever the situation and postulations made, the
scenario  is  clear ;  that  the  democratization  process in  Cameroon  is  a  tailored  one
designed to meet the aspirations of those currently in power and not one of government
by the people  and for  the people.  Hence a  new political  and economic development
agenda emerging from a rapprochement of the Cameroon people and a revitalized civil
society is required to promote economic growth and democracy in the country. The state
must  be  brought  back  from  the  current  wondering  expeditions  to  that  of  national
reconstruction, economic and political progress to counter act the negative effects of
globalization disparity and dwindling welfare gap both between and within the country.
56 The major challenge for the government or state is that of regaining trust. For the past
two decades, the state has lost credibility and legitimacy. The issue is to regain lost trust
and confidence. Regaining the trust of the people ‑ civil society requires at least, three
major shifts by government leaders and others in authority.
• Responding to the citizenry (civil society) in its diverse formation ;
• Finding and publicizing new examples of public stewardship ; 
• Collaborating across traditional boundaries, whether of party, class, geography, or perceived
interests.
57 The  failure  of  government  to  fulfil  its  obligation  of  the  social  contract  –  irregular
payment  of  salaries  and  other  debts  owed  the  people,  the  state  of  insecurity,
non‑functioning of  public  services  and utilities,  the total  absence of  the rule  of  law,
armed  forces  pursuit  and  arrest  of  innocent  citizens  and  their  collaboration with
criminals and other bandits, dismissal of employers for not toeing the ideals of the ruling
party, breakdown in law and order, the politics of fanning ethnic cleansing and conflict
all amount to a bridge of trust on the part of the State.
58 Clearly, the challenge to regain trust in the Cameroon society is immense. the State has to
work harder more than ever before to reinstate lost confidence and regain legality and
legitimacy  with  civil  society.  A  cord  of  peace  and  reconciliation  must  be  brokered
between the State and civil  society.  The wind of  political  change blowing across  the
continent implies that a recovery of civil society is taking place in Cameroon. That wind
of  charge  begins  with  the  resurgence  of  local  voluntary  efforts  of  citizens  banding
together to solve their common problems. When conditions are right, it moves forward to
inject new life to the structures of government by creating and expanding arena of "civic
Building a Vibrant State‑Civil Society in Cameroon Facing the Changes of the ...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 18 | 1999
11
governance". This happened on 26 May 1990. An event that has given a new political
dimension to the country and which existing forces cannot hold back but make sure that
the re‑democratization train keeps moving forward and in the right direction.
59 On  the  other  hand,  government  is  not  a  bad  public  service vehicle ;  it  is  just  an
incomplete one. On top of that, it cannot do the job all by itself. Government lacks the
necessary competence and other vital mechanisms ‑ a key ingredient of civil society. That
is  why the marriage between the two is  imperative for society to move in the right
direction.
60 Since the ideals of democracy and civil  society was floated in 1990, it  is not by pure
chances that participatory rapid appraisal (a methodology which allows people to have a
greater say and control over the direction of their lives and which ensures that no one
institution overpowers others) should also be taking hold in the country. This is simply in
part a reaction to the many disappointments and failures in system of governance which
Cameroonians have been subjected to that so much effort is going into finding ways to
realize this idealism.
61 The challenge today, and henceforth, is to unite the various communities and fragments
into finding and creating a connection between the State and citizens to reconstitute civil
society  as  an  inherent  way  forward  to  an  endurable  democratic  governance  and
socio‑economic development system.
Conclusion : surviving the 21st century
62 The legacy of the dominant one‑party politics and centralized bureaucratic set up is likely
to  persist  stubbornly  in  endless  petty  and  profound  ways  far  deep  into  the  new
millennium. Breaking it requires intensive education and empowering of the victims of
the system as well as equally re‑educating the advocates of the system, and, of course,
promoting  dialogue  between  the  various  political  and  economic  stake  holders.  Civil
society associations in various ways have a crucial role to play in the process of political
change, curbing political violence, limiting the politics of ethnic hegemony and cleansing
through mobilization of all available societal resources (natural and human), mobilization
of  community  participation  and  vigilance,  and  as  well  as  adopting,  articulating  and
aggregating a policy of reconciliation, consensus, dialogue and participation between the
various contending political forces.
63 Given the new level of political knowledge and democratic understanding amongst the
widest  segment  of  the  population  due  to  the  many decades  of  the  legalization  of  a
dominant monolithic political system that excluded the politics of participation. 
64 The mass media, has during the past half decade played the important role of awareness
creation and education amongst the people. That effort should not be allowed to decline.
Rather,  all  civic  associations  should join forces  to  advance the return to democratic
governance and good management. This implies "reinventing government" where the
entire governmental system and structure is made to "work better and cost less" (Troxel
1995 ; Osborne & Gaebler 1992).
65 Throughout the continent (and Cameroon in particular), ordinary people are demanding
a  second  independence ;  this  time  from  the  indigenous  leadership  whose  social,
industrial, economic and political mismanagement, together with brutal repression, have
made  mere  survival  all  but  impossible.  There  is  an  increased  awareness  among
Cameroonians that the monopoly or power enjoyed by failed leadership has to be broken
in order that power can be transferred to the people who have little to lose and much to
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gain ; that is why demonstrations for democratization in Cameroon persisted in the 1990s
in spite of repression, and will continue to do so ; and why civil society organizations
have found a growing and reliable base in Opposition Parties. The question of course,
remains, for how long will belly politics reign ?
66 The regime is very effective and efficient in spoil politics ‑  of divide and rule.  This it
applied in 1992 which split the NUDP into two blocks. And of recent, the same strategy
was adopted in splitting the SDF. However, it failed. The countervailing forces of the State
should not be under estimated in the process of destabilizing opposition parties.
67 Presently, the democracy movement and train for political reconstruction in Cameroon is
a powerful objective, historical force as it continues to express the desire of the ordinary
people to gain power and material improvement ‑ quality living standards for all by the
year 2010. There are indications that the desire for material improvement is fuelling the
democratization process in Cameroon. This has far‑reaching consequences. This implies,
first that the feasibility of democratization will depend partly on the correlation of this
process with better economic prospects. Second, the critical importance of the economic
factor  in the Cameroon democracy movement will  mean a  change of  emphasis  from
abstract legal and political rights to social and economic rights ; from laissez‑faire and
the  tolerance  of  economic  inequality  to  the  acceptance  of  considerable  economic
intervention  in  the  market  place  in  the  interests  of  growth  and  redistribution  of
economic wealth.
68 Civil society is revitalising itself to playing a more fundamental role to further the course
of economic and democratic liberalization. The creation of a democratic and development
culture remains crucial and constitute the only way forward to building a vibrant and
sustainable society. Cameroon is currently facing growing crisis in health care, welfare,
unemployment,  and  many  other  critical  issues.  The  resolution  to  these  issues  even
though with a 8.9 percent increase in the 1999‑2000 budget allocation. are not at all c1ear.
Yet these Gordian knots form the stuff of the recovery of civil society in Cameroon. It is
even more clear given the failure rate of the governance that they cannot be resolved in
conventional terms and forms. They key in finding the way out is a return to civil society
through the  community  and its  citizens  working  together  with  the  state.  What  this
entails is that of civil society shifting the emphasis on government as "problem‑solver" to
the  development  of  civic  muscle  and  of  local  communities  and  institutions  in  the
community contributing to creating a safer and enabling environment.
69 As of now, peace and tranquillity has so far reigned in Cameroon ; it is an envy of other
states  within  the  Central  African  Sub‑region.  Implying  that  a  strong  civil  society  in
Cameroon can equally be a catalyst for radical changes ‑ political and economic ‑ in the
sub‑region. Now that the urgent challenges of breaking the back of the single party has
passed, there are massive new requirements and challenges for civil society to intensify
efforts  in  the  re‑democratization  process.  Democracy  is  more  than  the  sum  of  its
institutions. A healthy democracy depends in large part on the development of a civic
culture. And culture here refers to the behaviours, practices and norms that define the
ability of a people to govern themselves.
70 On the other hand, a single party or totalitarian system that was established in Cameroon
between  1966  and  1990  encouraged  a  culture  of  passivity  and  apathy.  Here  the
government moulded an obedient and docile citizenry. Thus the events of 26 May 1990,
moved Cameroon. From the established state of totalitarianism to embracing democracy ‑
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that is creating a civic culture of a democratic society. A democratic society shaped by the
freely chosen activities of individuals and groups for the common good.
71 Democracy has  to  be  recreated in  the  context  of  the  given realities  and in  political
arrangements which  fit  the  cultural  context,  but  without  sacrificing  its  values  and
inherent  principles.  In  Cameroon  this  fit  is  likely  to  entail,  among  other  things,  a
"consocietal" arrangement ‑ the use of every ethnic group, social class, communities as
the constituencies for representation. There is a need for the establishment of a highly
yet  representative  decentralized  system  of  government  with  equal  emphasis  on
individual  and  communal  rights.  It  has  also  to  be  understood  that  democracy  in
Cameroon is not something that will emerge from a rational blueprint ; it must emerge
from practical experiences and improvisation in the course of a hard struggle.
72 The process towards democracy and economic liberalization in Cameroon must be shaped
by the singular  reality  that  those whose democratic  participation is  at  issue are the
ordinary people of the country ‑ the buy and sell group, the marginalized poor many are
illiterate,  and almost ail  are poor ;  rural  dwellers in an essentially pre‑industrial  and
communal society. The international community most develop an obligation to support
Cameroonian democratization process, not to support existing power structures focused
to achieve only the democracy of alienation ‑ power not to the people but to the existing
powerful and exploitative classes.
73 Therefore,  reconciliation,  understanding,  tolerance  and  mutual  respect  should  be
fostered and bridges constructed across the various economic, racial, ethnic, and political
divide.  In  short,  there  is  real  hope  for  democracy  and  economic  liberalization  in
Cameroon, the sub‑region and the continent as long as a strong civil society is put in
place and functions most appropriately within the framework outlined by Diamond. The
fact  remains  that  these  multiple  diverse  pluralistic  foundations  of  civil  society  that
emerged in 1990 remain capable of  forging,  changing and reconstructing society and
culture that  can have a  chain effect  to redressing existing situation of  authoritarian
governance form in other parts of the Central African sub‑region.
74 Finally, broad democratic legitimacy cannot be established unless democracy is able to
work and function properly to improve the appalling conditions of the life of the vast
majority  of  the  marginalized  population.  A  change  in  that  direction  can be  realised
provided  we  are  all  willing  to  see  democracy  and  other  changes  triumph  over
authoritarianism and self‑accumulation.
75 Civic organization can help the people realize they themselves are a resource. It creates a
people of consciousness of their potential and their power as a group over the power
holders. It enhances not only their political rights but of social and economic rights as
well. Powerless people are not only powerless in a political sense but even more so in a
socio‑economic sense.  The poor are often badly treated even by others like them or
slightly  better  off.  Empowering  the  poor  through  building  their  human  capacity  ‑
education constitute one major role of civil society in bringing progress in the society.
The lack of education and skills makes it more difficult to help out their poverty and
much effort and creative thinking is still needed in that direction.
76 The challenge of the next century will be to build democracy on a more human sc ale,
ensure  good  management  of  both  human and natural  resources,  and  to  expand the
capacity of citizens for self‑governance and public problem solving. Civil society enables
people  to  be  positive  about  the  future.  Being  positive  means  creating  sustainability.
Building a Vibrant State‑Civil Society in Cameroon Facing the Changes of the ...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 18 | 1999
14
Sustainability  is  inevitable  and the  Cameroon population must  not  allow its  cultural
heritage to collapse, but to use culture as the framework and basis of development and in
the sustainability of an emerging democracy and management.
77 Certain  core  values  ‑  inclusive  participation  and  pluralism  with  honour  ‑  or  trust,
reciprocity, tolerance and inclusion constitute key concepts and values of eliciting inputs,
participation and consensus embodied in the values of democracy and development. The
act of developing these values is an act of civil society itself. Civil society must bring
together peoples and groups at the various levels of society to identify core values and,
sharpen their focus on what to aspire and assist in no small measure in realizing their
aspirations ‑ democratic governance and quality improvement in living standards.
78 The formation of Opposition Parties in the 1990s marked the beginning of a movement to
reform  the  state.  If  repeated  more  broadly  (i.e.  the  civic  associations  being  on  the
progressive  and  reconciliatory  offensive),  this  activity  could  catalyze  a  reformation
movement for the institutionalization of a genuine democratization cultural process in
Cameroon  with  effects  far  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  country.  The  promise  of  the
post‑single era rests largely on the potential of the country creating a strong, vibrant
coherent and deeply rooted civic associations and institutions that mediate between the
state and the people, the connective tissue of a democratic political culture. The best
choice for Cameroon is to build a vibrant society for the sustainability of the nation‑state.
Recommendations
• State‑civil society harmony constitute a healthy sign for the growth of authentic democracy.
• Civil society or organizations are crucial instruments for democratic change and
socialization because they functions as continuous instruments of participation and
mobilization.
• Civil society contributes to the development of democratic culture in many ways which can
be used by the state for awareness creation. The more pluralistic and coherent civil society
is the more it benefits democracy.
• The State must bear its responsibility of ensuring balanced development and providing the
needs of society equitably.
• Civil society is never constructed or consolidated by ignoring others or by shouting them
down.
• The legitimacy and authority of the state is more enhanced through a transparent,
accountable, participatory regime form.
• Politics and economics are inherently linked and progress in one requires the support or
progress in the other.
• There is an urgent need for "reinventing government" in Cameroon and to ensure "total
quality management" as instruments for moving the country in the right path of sustainable
development.
• Cameroonians must articulate and aggregate policies that fight against ethnic disparity and
other dishumanizing corollaries, and put in place mechanisms for living together as a
diverse people in a one and indivisible Cameroon village – this constitute a serious challenge
to be resolved.
• There is also the urgent need for reinventing citizenship ‑ ensuring shared values that stress
a balance between rights and responsibilities of citizens ‑ democracy being "of the people by
the people, for the people" in the words of Lincoln, and not against the people.
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• Democracy itself guarantees nothing. It offers instead the opportunity to succeed as well as
the risk of failure. Yet building on Thomas Jefferson's shrewd phrase ; the promise of
democracy is "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness".
• Government of and by the people implies that the citizens of a democratic society share in
its benefits and in its burdens. And of course, must take the responsibility for the failure and
fate of the state ‑ hence, a country gets the government it deserves. The challenge is for civil
society to work towards a better governance system.
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